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Global Green Governance: Embedding the Green
Economy in a Global Green and Equitable Rule of
Law Polity
Joyeeta Gupta and Nadia Sanchez
The global community is crossing planetary bound-
aries while it has not yet met the basic needs of at least
one-third of the global population. Although gover-
nance systems are developing, they are still unable to
adequately deal with current global environmental
problems. This article assesses global green gover-
nance, inferring that it is reactive, incoherent and
fragmented, lacks the tools to implement a systemic
approach, is ad hoc rather than principled, is becom-
ing politically charged, and may be unable to support
the implementation of a green economy and cope with
the societal changes expected by 2050. The article con-
cludes that fragmentation of international environ-
mental law and policy is inevitable, but that some
degree of constitutionalization is necessary to provide
a rule of law framework in an increasingly globalized,
networked, multilevel world.
INTRODUCTION
This article assumes that law is not an isolated field, but
that it must continuously and systematically respond
to, and anticipate, social changes and new scientific
knowledge without compromising on key legal values
such as the rule of law. It addresses two closely linked
problems. First, global environmental problems are
crossing planetary boundaries,1 and stressing ecosys-
tems.2 And yet, the minimum needs of the global popu-
lation remain unmet and the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) unreached.3 Environmental problems
affect lives, ecosystems, as well as ecosystem services
(supportive, regulatory, provisioning and aesthetic).4 If
our ecosystems cannot provide these services, we may
be unable to meet global minimum social standards
and compromise future development. For example, if
current environmental pollution trends are not
reversed, the Human Development Index may be
8–15% lower than otherwise in 2050.5 Second,
although global governance is evolving incrementally, it
has not controlled the climate change problem, halted
deforestation or protected our ecosystems.6
These problems are critical issues at the 2012 United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio
(Rio+20).7 The summit aims to secure political commit-
ment to sustainable development, assess progress
towards achieving past goals, including those in Agenda
218 and the MDGs, and deal with emerging challenges.
It has two themes: a green economy; and the institu-
tional framework for sustainable development.9 This
article aims to contribute primarily to the second
theme. More specifically, it examines existing patterns
in international environmental governance, as well as
expected trends until 2050, and argues that although
the fragmentation of international environmental
1 J. Rockström et al., ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’,
461:7263 Nature (2009), 472.
2 N. Myers et al., ‘Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities’,
403:6772 Nature (2000), 853.
3 For example, while the percentage of undernourished people has
reduced from 20% (1990) to 15% (2008), the absolute numbers have
remain unchanged. Some 2.6 billion people still lack access to
improved sanitation. The 2011 Millennium Development Goals
Report states that the poverty reduction target has been met only by
45 of the 84 countries for which there is data (out of a total of 144
countries). Progress to Date and Remaining Gaps in the Implemen-
tation of the Outcomes of the Major Summits in the Area of Sustain-
able Development, as well as an Analysis of the Themes of the
Conference, Report of the Secretary General, (A/CONF.216/PC/2,
1 April 2010), paragraph 15.
4 Provisioning services include food, water, energy; regulating ser-
vices include carbon sequestration, climate regulation, waste decom-
position and detoxification; supporting services include nutrient
cycling and seed dispersal; and aesthetic/cultural services include the
significance of these ecosystems to the societies that live in them.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-
being: Synthesis (Island Press, 2005).
5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Devel-
opment Report, Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All
(UNDP, 2011), at 2.
6 B. Walker et al., ‘Looming Global-scale Failures and Missing Insti-
tutions’, 325:5972 Science (2009), 1345; F. Biermann et al., ‘Earth
System Governance: A Research Framework’ 10:4 International
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2010),
277.
7 <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.html>.
8 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development
(Volume I), Agenda 21 (A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, 14 June 1992), found
at <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/index.shtml>.
9 Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Imple-
mentation of Agenda 21 and the Outcomes of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/
64/236, 24 December 2009).
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governance may be inevitable, constitutionalization for
amultilevel legal system is necessary to provide support
for new legal tools capable of dealing with a systems
approach and promoting a green economy.
ASSESSING GLOBAL
GREEN GOVERNANCE
A BRIEF HISTORY OF GLOBAL
GREEN GOVERNANCE
Environmental challenges first appeared on the global
political agenda as ad hoc issues (e.g., the impact of
DDT on bird’s eggs, threats to single species like
pandas and whales, and deforestation). They were
mainly tackled by issue-specific policy responses (e.g.,
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species10 and the Whaling Convention11). As different
environmental challenges became linked, this led to
the identification of a comprehensive environmental
problem,12 evoking policy responses on common envi-
ronmental (e.g., the 1972 Stockholm Declaration13)
and water-related issues (e.g., the 1977 Mar Del Plata
Action Plan14). The next two decades experienced the
interlocked relationship between environment and
development (e.g., the 1992 UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development),15 leading to global con-
sensus and prioritization of the concept of ‘sustainable
development’ at the 2002 World Summit on Sustain-
able Development,16 which was reiterated in the pre-
paratory work for the 2012 summit in Rio.
Environmental accidents (in Bhopal in 1984, and
Chernobyl in 1985), disasters (like Hurricane Katrina
in 2005) and creeping environmental problems (like
drought, chemical pollution, depletion of fish stocks
and climate change) disrupt development patterns and
provide a new impetus to prioritize basic needs and
the environment,17 although the global economic
recession has cast a damper on current efforts.
The links between the environment and other aspects of
development (e.g., energy), and security (from local
to global) have made environmental problems very
complex. This has led to discourses on environment
policy integration,18 integrated water resource manage-
ment (IWRM),19 mainstreaming environment into
development20 and the green economy.21 However,
implementing these discourses is not easy because of
competitiveness, free-rider and leakage arguments,22
because we lack systemic instruments, and because
countries continue to ‘treat poverty, infectious dis-
ease and environmental degradation as stand-alone
threats’.23 However, the interlocking nature may lead
environmental issues to be framed as high-politics
issues, whichmay either result in rapid responses in the
context of an interdependent world or to intensive com-
petition as each actor tries to maximize his or her own
gains in a neoliberal world.
CHALLENGES IN SPECIFIC ISSUES
IN GLOBAL GREEN GOVERNANCE
The aforementioned challenges will now be further
explored for the specific issue areas of water, forest
and climate governance.
10 Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (Washington, DC, 3 March 1973) (CITES).
11 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Washing-
ton, DC, 2 December 1946).
12 Friends of the Earth, Only One Earth: An Introduction to the Politics
of Survival (Earth Island, 1972).
13 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment
(A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 16 June 1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’).
14 Mar Del Plata Action Plan, Report of the UN Water Conference
(E/CONF.70/29, 25 March 1977) (‘Mar Del Plata Action Plan’).
15 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future: Brundtland Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development (Oxford University Press, 1987); C.
Ponting, A Green History of the World: The Environment and the
Collapse of Great Civilizations (St Martin’s Press, 1991).
16 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, found in
Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002), found at <http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.
pdf>.
17 UN Millennium Declaration (UN General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/55/2, 8 September 2000).
18 M. Nilsson, M. Pallemaerts and I. von Homeyer, ‘International
Regimes and Environmental Policy Integration: Introducing the
Special Issue’ 9:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics,
Law and Economics (2009), 337.
19 IWRM was introduced in Agenda 21. Ministers and heads of states
are increasingly committing to it at the meetings of the World Water
Forums, and especially at the last World Water Forum in 2009.
See Ministerial Statement (5th World Water Forum, Istanbul, 22
March 2009), found at <http://content.worldwaterforum5.org/files/
PoliticalProcess/Ministerial_Statement_22_3_09.pdf>.
20 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UNDP, Guid-
ance Note on Mainstreaming Environment into National Development
Planning (UNEP-UNDP, 2007); F. Seymour et al., Environmental
Mainstreaming: Applications in the Context of Modernization of the
State, Social Development, Competitiveness and Regional Integra-
tion (Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Development
Department, 2005).
21 UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable
Development and Poverty Eradication (UNEP, 2010), found at <http://
www.unep.org/greeneconomy>.
22 The competitiveness argument refers to the fact that some coun-
tries feel that unilateral measures may make their products more
expensive in the international market, meaning that they do not wish
to take measures except in consultation with other countries. The free
rider argument refers to the fact that some countries may not join a
coalition of countries taking action and can thus benefit from the
measures taken by others without themselves helping in addressing
global problems. The leakage argument refers to a situation in which
one country takes measures – for instance, to reduce deforestation –
but world demand for products leads to more environmental destruc-
tion elsewhere.
23 ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (A/59/565, 2
December 2004), at 27, found at <http://www.un.org/secureworld/>.
RECIEL 21 (1) 2012 GLOBAL GREEN GOVERNANCE
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
13
Global water governance has passed through trans-
boundary institutionalization experiments (pre-1960),
multiple UN water policy initiatives (1960–1992),24
hybridization of policies with the entry of non-state
actors and hybrid coalitions in the governance arena
(1992–2003),25 and an attempt at system-wide coher-
ence with the establishment of UN Water since 2003.
International water law has moved away from fluvial
treaties26 to the codification of water law principles in
196627 and 2004,28 the entry into force of a regional
water Convention29 and Protocol,30 the adoption of a
global Watercourses Convention,31 the introduction of
a human right to water and sanitation,32 and prece-
dents in water adjudication.33 This may suggest a
gradual consolidation of global water governance.
However, since the Watercourses Convention is not
yet in force, and water is dealt with by many bodies
with only light coordination by UN Water, the field is
diffuse and fragmented.34 Concepts like IWRM remain
poorly defined,35 while trade and investment rules
have helped make water into a private commodity
subject to confidential contracts, international dispute
settlement36 and arbitration rules.37 The hybrid (UN/
non-UN) governance processes do not follow clear
rules of procedure and are less than legitimate, and
the meetings of the World Water Forums do not nec-
essarily produce binding agreements.38 The gover-
nance vacuum has led to inconsistent policies and
funding for strategies that are not necessarily relevant
for recipient countries.39
Unlike water, which is governed primarily in relation to
its transboundary character, forests fall mostly within
national jurisdiction. Yet forests are difficult to govern:
not all States see forests as a global issue or as an envi-
ronmental public good; forest definitions adopted in
different fora are inconsistent; ownership rights to
forests are heavily contested; the designation of land
with tree cover as forests is politically sensitive with
equity implications for the land owner; and the costs of
maintaining forests are often higher than the direct
financial returns.40 Direct global forest governance
(focused specifically on forest management) can be
traced back to the creation of the International Tropi-
cal Timber Organization, while indirect governance
arrangements focusing on ancillary issues include the
International Labour Organization rules on indigenous
peoples41 and treaties on endangered species,42 heri-
tage,43 biodiversity44 and climate change45 as well as
initiatives of both UN and non-UN agencies. In addi-
tion, system-wide coherence is pursued through the UN
Forum on Forests (established in 2000) and the Col-
laborative Partnership on Forests (established in 2001),
which both bring together various of the forest-related
organizations efforts. Although ongoing efforts in the
area of reduced emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD) frame forests in relation to some
of their ecosystem services, processes have been ad hoc
24 These include the Stockholm Declaration, n. 13 above; the Mar del
Plata Action Plan, n. 14 above; and the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, found in Report of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14
June 1992), Annex (‘Rio Declaration’).
25 See, e.g., Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Develop-
ment, adopted at the International Conference on Water and the
Environment (Dublin, 31 January 1992); World Commission on
Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
making (Earthscan, 2000). This development was further exemplified
by the establishment of the World Water Council and the World Water
Forum.
26 UNEP, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, Oregon
State University (UNEP, 2002), at 2.
27 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers, printed in Report of the Fifty-second Conference of the Inter-
national Law Association held at Helsinki, 14–20 August 1966 (Inter-
national Law Association (ILA), 20 August 1966).
28 International Law Association, Berlin Rules on Water Resources, in
Report of the Seventy-first Conference (London, 2004), found at
<http://www.ila-hq.org/en/Others/document-summary.cfm/docid/
B6F2AD1C-11B5-45A3-89534097AD1FEE95>.
29 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992).
30 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Interna-
tional Lakes (London, 17 June 1999).
31 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses (New York, 21 May 1997) (‘Watercourses
Convention’).
32 The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (UN General Assembly
Resolution A/RES/64/292, 28 July 2010). See, for a discussion,
J. Gupta et al., ‘The Human Right to Water: Moving toward Consen-
sus in a Fragmented World’, 19:3 RECIEL (2010), 294.
33 ICJ 25 September 1997, Hungary v. Slovakia (‘Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros Case’), [1994] ICJ Rep. 151.
34 C. Pahl-Wostl et al., ‘Governance and the Global Water
System: A Theoretical Exploration’, 14:4 Global Governance (2008),
419.
35 K. Conca, Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics
and Global Institution Building (MIT Press, 2006).
36 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (Washington, DC, 18 March
1965).
37 A.-M. Klijn et al., ‘Privatising Environmental Resources: The Need
for Supervision’, 18:2 RECIEL (2009), 172.
38 P. Gleick and J. Lane, ‘Large International Water Meetings: Time
for a Reappraisal’, 30:3 Water International (2005), 410.
39 J. Gupta, ‘Driving Forces around Global Fresh Water Governance’,
in D. Huitema and S. Meijerink (eds.), Water Policy Entrepreneurs:
A Research Companion to Water Transitions around the Globe
(Edward Elgar, 2009), 37.
40 J. Gupta and E. Bergsma, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Assessing
Multi-level (Forestry) Governance’ (manuscript on file with authors).
41 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention (Geneva, 26 June
1957).
42 See CITES, n. 10 above.
43 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (Paris, 16 November 1972).
44 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992)
(‘CBD’).
45 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May
1992) (‘UNFCCC’). Another key UN initiative related to reducing
deforestation is the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing
Countries (‘UN-REDD’), found at <http://www.un-redd.org>.
JOYEETA GUPTA AND NADIA SANCHEZ RECIEL 21 (1) 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
14
and incoherent46 – and there is no guarantee that the
REDD process will in fact lead to protection of ecosys-
tem services.
Climate change is an unquestioned global issue. The
regime developed in response to global scientific
assessments and led to the adoption of the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
199247and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.48 However,
although the treaty regime moved rapidly (compared to
global water and forest governance), the targets and
timetables set out in the UNFCCC49 and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol50 have lost momentum, and follow-up targets
are conditional and voluntary,51 leaving little incentive
to implement cost-effective mechanisms, such as the
Clean DevelopmentMechanism and REDD. The United
States’ refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,52 as well as
the more recent decision by Canada to withdraw from
the Protocol, have further pointed to a weakening of the
regime. The development of many other climate-related
agreements53 may divert attention away from the
binding targets approach needed to address the climate
problem.54
CHALLENGES IN THE STRUCTURE
OF GLOBAL GREEN GOVERNANCE
In general, environmental issues are addressed by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
since the 1972 Stockholm Conference. However,
climate change was explicitly not entrusted to UNEP
but to the UN General Assembly, and most environ-
mental issues fall under the purview of many other UN
agencies, lightly coordinated by the UN Environment
Management Group. The issue of reorganizing interna-
tional environmental governance has been on the
agenda since 1992.
There aremany theoretical options for reorganization,55
each with its own pros and cons,56 of which at present
six options are being considered in the discussions on
the institutional framework for sustainable develop-
ment in preparation for the Rio+20 Summit: strength-
ening UNEP; strengthening the Commission on
Sustainable Development; creating a UN Environment
Organization (UNEO); monitoring and enforcing mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); clustering
MEAs to achieve coherence and efficiency; and improv-
ing the context of international environmental arbitra-
tion.57 Some of these approaches are being supported by
intellectual efforts at improving global environmental
governance.58 There are a number of challenges that
influence the process of deciding how to structure gov-
ernance at the global level. These include the fact that
there are existing bodies with their own legal mandates
and contractual arrangements which cannot be phased
out easily; the need to keep expenses down in designing
a new body; the fear of countries that a strong central-
ized body with substantial powers may intervene in the
sovereign powers of a country; and the very different
perspectives of countries on how to compartmentalize
issues and how much priority should be given to them.
THE DOMINANT DISCOURSE:
TOWARDS A GREEN ECONOMY
A key substantive challenge at the global level is how to
reconcile environmental issues with the growth para-
digm. The ideological stress between environmental
and capitalist paradigms has given birth to the concept
of the ‘green economy’.59 The UN Secretary General has
identified four different interpretations: the internal-
46 D. Humphreys, Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global
Governance (Earthscan, 2006), at 213. See also J. Rayner, A. Buck
and P. Kapila (eds.), Embracing Complexity: Meeting the Challenges
of International Forest Governance. A Global Assessment Report.
Prepared by the Global Forest Expert Panel on the International
Forest Regime (IUFRO, 2010).
47 UNFCCC, n. 45 above.
48 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997).
49 UNFCCC, n. 45 above, Article 4.2 (a) and (b).
50 See Kyoto Protocol, n. 48 above, Article 3.
51 J. Gupta, ‘Climate Change: A GAP Analysis Based on Third World
Approaches to International Law’, 53 German Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law (2010), 341.
52 J. Gupta, ‘A History of International Climate Change Policy’, 1:5
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews (2010), 636.
53 See, e.g., the Global Methane Initiative at <http://www.
globalmethane.org/>; and the International Partnership for Hydrogen
and Fuel Cells in the Economy, at <http://www.iphe.net/>.
54 M. Allen, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Tangible Targets are Critical’, 3:10
Nature Reports Climate Change (2009), 114.
55 These include: the hierarchical, integrated sustainable develop-
ment organization (e.g., a World Sustainable Development Organi-
zation), which would cover all environmental and developmental
issues; the hierarchical, single issue organization which would focus
only on environmental issues (e.g., a World Environment Organiza-
tion); a high-level advisory group which would focus on specific
issues and would include people with a high profile; a non-
hierarchical focal point, which could be an existing body that takes on
the role of being the focal point for discussions; coordination bodies,
which would include UN Water, UN Energy and the UN Environment
Management Group; strengthening individual bodies such as UNEP;
promoting coordination through common principles, such as the Rio
Principles; regime clustering – combining different treaty regimes into
one body; and decentralized network organizations, which would
allow individual bodies to network and collaborate. See J. Gupta,
‘Global Sustainable Development Governance: Institutional Chal-
lenges from a Theoretical Perspective’, 2:4 International Environmen-
tal Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2002), 361.
56 J. Gupta, n. 55 above.
57 See <http://www.earthsummit2012.org/institutional-framework-for-
sd/issues>.
58 Earth System Governance Project, ‘Rio +20 Policy Brief:
Transforming Governance and Institutions for a Planet under
Pressure’ (London, March 2012), found at <http://www.
earthsystemgovernance.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/
Policy-Brief-3_Institutional-Framework.pdf>.
59 See UNEP, n. 21 above.
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ization of environmental externalities to reduce market
imperfections; a broader systemic perspective to incor-
porate environmental challenges within the economic
order; linking social goals (like job creation) to eco-
nomic goals; and a newmacroeconomic framework that
designs a pathway towards sustainable development.60
This re-ordering of global society will be one of the two
themes discussed at Rio+20.
Policy ideas to implement a green economy include
re-inventing economies; getting the prices right (e.g.,
internalization of environmental externalities, green
taxes, linking social goals with economic goals);
investing in a sustainable infrastructure; promoting
science-based sustainable product chains; the demate-
rialization and decarbonization of society; multiple
land use and sustainable agriculture; better water use
and the protection of ecosystem services; sustainable
procurement policies for the State; and empowering
people through education, research and dialogue to
ensure that access to basic services becomes an enforce-
able right and that protecting the environment is a par-
allel responsibility.61 Although these elements are all
critical and useful ideas, actually implementing them
through instruments that can take their systemic char-
acter into account is very difficult. For example, decar-
bonization as part of the green economy is easier said
than executed.
THE DOMINANT CHALLENGE:
ADOPTING AN INCLUSIVE AND
EQUITABLE PROCESS
While the major substantive challenge was reconciling
environmental goals with growth goals, a major politi-
cal challenge is reconciling conflicting North–South
perspectives about the state of global governance. The
ThirdWorld Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
school62 argued in its first post-Second World War
phase63 that international law was a hegemonic tool to
promote, justify and protect the interests of the power-
ful; in its second phase that economic institutions were
institutionalizing an unfair economic order;64 in the
post 9/11 phase that international law and politics are
becoming more intrusive;65 and in the wake of the
American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol that the
climate regime is institutionalizing a new pragmatism
in international environmental law that compromises
equity.66 TWAIL scholars argue that treaties take a
‘West-centric’67 approach and embody explicit and
implicit norms that institutionalize inequities68 by pre-
scribing standard solutions to an unequal world. They
argue that international lawyers should also account for
the interests of the developing countries,69 scrutinize
universalist arguments,70 and unpack discourses that
hide colonial and neo-colonial approaches.71
IMPLICATIONS
On the basis of the above, we can point to a number of
implications for international environmental gover-
nance. First, international environmental governance
is ‘reactive’,72 not proactive. Second, it is incoherent
across related sectors (e.g., environment and trade),73
as well as fragmented within sectors (e.g., water,74
energy,75 forests76). Third, there is a substantive evolu-
tion from sectoral to systemic analysis (e.g., in water
towards IWRM,77 in biodiversity towards an ecosystem
approach,78 in climate change from a technocratic to a
60 See Report of the Secretary General, n. 3 above, at paragraph 44.
61 Based, inter alia, on the Report of the Secretary General, n. 3
above, at paragraph 44; Commission Communication of 8 March
2011, A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy
in 2050, COM(2011)112; National Platform Rio+20, Priorities for a
Sustainable Future: Civil Society Outcomes for the Netherlands
Rio+20 Preparations (2011), found at <http://www.nprio2012.nl/
wp-content/uploads/2011/06/NPRio+20-priorities-for-a-sustainable-
future.pdf>.
62 M. Khosla, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New
Phase’, 9:3 International Community Law Review (2007), 291; B.S.
Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’,
8:1 International Community Law Review (2006), 3; O.C. Okafor,
‘Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A
TWAIL Perspective’, 43(1–2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2005), 171;
O.C. Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL): Theory, Methodology or Both?’, 10:4 International Commu-
nity Law Review (2008), 371.
63 See M. Khosla, n. 62 above.
64 M. Salomon, ‘Poverty, Privilege and International Law: The Millen-
nium Development Goals and the Guise of Humanitarianism’, 52
German Yearbook of International Law (2009), 39, at 51.
65 See M. Khosla, n. 62 above.
66 See J. Gupta, n. 51 above.
67 K. Mickelson, ‘Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories’, 10:4 International
Community Law Review (2008), 355, at 358.
68 See, e.g., B. Rajagopal, ‘Counter-hegemonic International Law:
Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strat-
egy’, 27:5 Third World Quarterly (2006), 767.
69 See O.C. Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches’, n. 62 above at
377–378.
70 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Asian Perspective to International Law in the
Age of Globalization’, 5:2 Singapore Journal of International and
Comparative Law (2001), 284, at 285.
71 See B.S. Chimni, n. 62 above, at 4; M. Sornarajah, n. 70 above, at
285; and O.C.Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism and International Legal
Reform’, n. 62 above, at 177.
72 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), at 620.
73 See, e.g., J.H. Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict’, 49:4 Washington and Lee Law
Review (1992), 1227.
74 See, generally, C. Pahl-Wostl et al., n. 34 above; see also J. Del-
lapenna and J. Gupta (eds.) The Evolution of the Law and Politics of
Water (Springer, 2008).
75 J. Gupta and A. Ivanova, ‘Global Energy Efficiency Governance in
the Context of Climate Politics’, 2:4 Energy Efficiency (2009), 339.
76 See D. Humphreys, n. 46 above.
77 See UNEP, n. 21 above. Whether States can actually implement
this concept remains problematic.
78 The ecosystem approach calls for integrating land, water and living
resource management to ensure conservation and sustainable use
and equity. This concept was made concrete at the Fifth Conference
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development approach79). Fourth, although we have
tools for sectoral management, we do not have the tools
(and political willingness) for integrated and systemic
management – such tools would have to be cross-
cutting tools that apply across sectors and imply a fun-
damental reordering of society. Furthermore, at the
global level there is a shift towards soft governance
(e.g., the biodiversity regime is ‘going soft’,80 and the
climate regime of targets and timetables is changing
into a pledge and review81 regime). Fifth, the TWAIL
school sees international law as continuously embody-
ing patterns of exploitation.
Going beyond these initial inferences, we can argue that
if environmental challenges enter the domain of ‘high
politics’, the political stakes will increase. The politici-
zation of environmental issues leads to the ad hoc use
of principles in different Conventions (e.g., the CBD
includes the limited sovereignty principle,82 whereas
the UNFCCC does not;83 the UNFCCC only has a limited
set of principles;84 and the principles in the Water-
courses Convention85 are not reflected in, or reflective
of, the Rio principles). The ad hoc incremental gover-
nance developments do not always meet good gover-
nance criteria: the shift to administrative law86 at the
international level bypasses State consent; public–
private mergers often transform public into economic
goods subject to private ownership and confidential
contracts;87 and legal fragmentation generates inconsis-
tent policies which may not meet the standards of legal-
ity, legitimacy, transparency and accountability.88 This
reflects the gradual erosion of the global legal order, the
decreasing importance being given to the concept of the
rule of law and the rise of alternative voluntary mecha-
nisms for governance that will be unable to promote the
green economy. All this calls for a trend break in gov-
ernance patterns,89 especially in light of the fact that a
large number of future studies predict accelerated
changes in the structure of society in the coming years.
THE FUTURE WORLD: TRENDS
AND IMPLICATIONS
If current governance trends continue, such governance
may remain reactive, fragmented, inequitable, unable
to deal with systemic problems, ad hoc rather than
principled, more spontaneous than predictable, and
may protect current and new hegemonic interests at the
cost of the rule of law and respect for global values. This
could well imply that without a trend break, law will be
unable to address the problems of the world in 2050.
Future studies by academics,90 political bodies91 and the
private sector92 show that society is changing in unrec-
ognizable directions. These studies discuss social,
economic, financial, technological, environmental and
geopolitical trends.
Social trends indicate that in 2050, the global popula-
tion will be nine billion, consuming at higher rates,
living mostly (75%) in urban areas,93 migrating to other
parts of the world, leading to the rise of newmultiethnic
societies with different value systems. These trends
may be affected by climate change, natural disasters,
wars or pandemics, as well as major social transitions.
Economic trends include the rise in global world output
by at least three times in 2050, and show that 19 of the
top 30 economies will be from the current group of
emerging economies and will be collectively bigger than
of Parties to the CBD. Decision V/6, Ecosystem Approach (UN Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, 22 June 2000).
79 J. Gupta and N. van der Grijp, ‘Climate Change, Development and
Development Cooperation’, in Mainstreaming Climate Change in
Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the
European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.
80 S. Harrop and D. Pritchard, ‘A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: The
Implications of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Current Tra-
jectory’, 21:2 Global Environmental Change (2011), 474.
81 See J. Gupta, n. 51 above, at 360–363.
82 See CBD, n. 44 above, Article 3.
83 The UNFCCC, n. 45 above, includes five sets of principles in Article
3, but relegates the limited sovereignty principle to a paragraph in the
preamble.
84 For example, the UNFCCC, n. 45 above, does not include the
‘polluter pays’ principle or the ‘liability and compensation’ principle.
85 The Watercourses Convention, n. 31 above, includes detailed
equity criteria for sharing water resources that cannot be found in the
Rio Declaration.
86 See, e.g., E. Hey, ‘The Climate Change Regime Sustainable Devel-
opment and International Administrative Law in the Making’, 1:1 Int.
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2000), 75;
J. Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-making under Multilateral
Environmental Agreements’, 15:1 Leiden Journal of International Law
(2002), 1.
87 J. Gupta, ‘Developing Countries: Trapped in the Web of Sustain-
able Development Governance’, in O. Dilling, M. Herberg and G.
Winter (eds.), Transnational Administrative Rule-making: Perfor-
mance, Legal Effects and Legitimacy (Hart, 2011), 305.
88 Ibid.
89 See Report of the Secretary General, n. 3 above, at paragraphs
19–21; B. Walker et al., n. 6 above, at 1345; F. Biermann et al., n. 6
above; cf. E. Blanco and J. Razzaque ‘Ecosystem Services and
Human Well-being in a Globalized World: Assessing the Role of Law’,
31:3 Human Rights Quarterly (2009), 692.
90 L.C. Smith, The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization’s
Northern Future (Dutton, 2010).
91 European Commission, European Forward-looking Activities:
Building the Future of ‘Innovation Union’ and ERA (Publication Office
of the EU, 2011); UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre, Future Character of Conflict (DCDC, 2010),
found at <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3E38C6EC-4A76-402F-
9E28-C571EAB9929F/0/fcoc_final_revised_12Feb10.pdf>.
92 For example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers has a series of reports on
the challenges and opportunities posed by the shift of global eco-
nomic power, found at <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050>.
93 United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Envi-
ronment (JOE): Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint
Force (USJFC, 2008), found at <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/
joe2008.pdf>.
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the current group of developed countries.94 Another
important trend is the changing face of poverty in that
poverty and income inequality will occur also in the
developed countries. Other trends include changing
trading partners, increasing trade in services via cyber-
space, outsourcing of employment to the changing
cheapest economies and to home and office robots, and
only very skilled and highly qualified people may still be
eligible for work.95 Financial globalization may take
unexpected routes in the aftermath of the current finan-
cial crises; new currencies may becomemore important
(e.g., the renminbi); and the use of special drawing
rights as a new control mechanism over the existing
financial institutions may lead to changes.
Technological changes through eco-, nano-, bio- and
info-technologies are expected to dramatically change
the way we live. Technological opportunities may create
extravagant lifestyles, including, for instance, space
travel. The rapid penetration of gadgets (mobile
devices) will transform the way we communicate and
may even influence the rise and fall of governments,
while knowledge may no longer be filtered for its accu-
racy, secrets may leak, intellectual property rights may
be disrespected, and cyber crime and espionage may
affect industrial, social and national security. However,
existing infrastructure, energy and transport may face
institutional, technological and political lock-in.
The above will affect the environment. The rising popu-
lation, growing life expectancy, technological opportu-
nities and increased income may result in a significant
increase in energy use and multiplying mineral extrac-
tion (especially copper, aluminium, rare metals, plati-
num). Furthermore, this may lead to increasing water
withdrawals from 20 to 85%, increasing local pollution,
and global temperatures may rise by 1.5–2 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2050. The growth
of global Gross Domestic Product by 3–6 times may
lead to another 10–20% of land being converted to agri-
culture, transforming habitats, increasing nutrient
loading by two-thirds, reducing edible fish populations
by 90% in comparison to pre-industrial levels, and
reducing plant species by 10–15%.96
In terms of geopolitics, almost all future studies indicate
that economic power may shift to the BRIC countries
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), and military power to
China. These new countries may shape the principles of
governance at the global level, and may question the
vision of democracy – either by pushing for the current
ad hoc approach or by uploading their own domestic
visions to the global level. A change in value systemsmay
occur as these newer countries take on amore dominant
role in global politics. If international law continues to
be reactive and not proactive, and if society changes
exponentially in terms of resource consumption and
waste and in terms of economic and political power,
ethnicity and culture, it may not be able to deal with the
problems of 2050. If the current way of dealing in an ad
hoc manner is continued, these developments may not
be in line with good governance, challenging the very
raison d’être of law. If the current shifts in law from a
hard to a soft character continue, this may undermine
the future of international law. International treaties are
different from political declarations in that they are
legally binding; however, if their content becomes soft,
there will be no need to use the treaty format. Further-
more, the new values of the new emerging economies
may prefer ad hoc governance, which suits their own
interests, over a more structured system of law. If these
trends continue into the future, global problems may
become evenmore exacerbated by the positive feedback
effects between negative environmental and develop-
ment trends.97 The lack of rule of law at the international
level will be further intensified, and global actionmay be
determined by the political and economic will of the
changing hegemons.
WHAT KIND OF GOVERNANCE
AND LAW WILL BE NEEDED IN
THE FUTURE?
To achieve a sustainable development trend break calls
for simultaneous demographic, developmental and
decoupling (environment from the economy) transi-
tions,98 which could possibly be supported by notions
such as the green economy. Such transitions need to be
supported by international governance processes. If law
is to be able to keep up with the twenty-first century, it
is important that the law not only develops rapidly and
proactively, but also that it is predictable, principled,
legitimate, accountable, transparent and equitable,
especially in a world of changing geopolitics. Law needs
to develop in order to counterbalance politics. This
section argues that although fragmentation is inevi-
table, some degree of constitutionalization and rule of
law is essential for coping with future problems.
THE INEVITABILITY OF
FRAGMENTATION
The existing fragmentation in international environ-
mental governance and law exists since it is not easy to
94 HSBC, The World in 2050: Quantifying the Shift in the Global
Economy (HSBC Global Research, January 2011).
95 By 2020, it is estimated that 35% of all jobs will require high-level
qualifications, combined with a capacity to adapt and innovate, com-
pared to the 29% of today. This means 15 million more jobs requiring
high-level qualification. See Commission Communication of 15 Sep-
tember 2010, ‘Youth on the Move: An Initiative to Unleash the Poten-
tial of Young People to Achieve Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth in the European Union’, COM(2010)477.
96 See, e.g., Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, n. 4 above, at
14–15.
97 See UNDP, n. 5 above, at 2.
98 See Report of the Secretary General, n. 3 above, at paragraph 36.
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differentiate and draw boundaries between problems
because of their interlocking character. Hence, it is
not entirely clear where the issue area of ‘forests’ ends
and where ‘climate change’ begins, or where ‘climate
change’ ends and ‘development’ begins. As such it will
be necessary to compartmentalize issues pragmatically.
If we accept this conclusion, then the discussion about
the fragmented nature of environmental governance
and law (e.g., in the fields of forests, water and, to a
lesser extent, climate change) becomes more an obser-
vation of what is happening than a driver for change.
There will be fragmentation as: environmental prob-
lems do not lend themselves to easy compartmentaliza-
tion, and are linked to trade and investment, if not
development,99 development cooperation100 and human
rights;101 States are unwilling to select one forum for a
comprehensive approach with which to deal with all
problems; and one comprehensive forum for global sus-
tainable development governance uniting trade, invest-
ment, development and environment may not be
feasible. However, this does not mean that policy
entrepreneurs should not continue to strive to achieve
coherence between treaties,102 adopt more stringent
targets,103 fill regulatory gaps,104 develop tools to deal
with systemic issues and strengthen national gover-
nance105 in order to enable States to contribute to and
implement international agreements.
THE NEED FOR THE RULE OF LAW
IN A MULTILEVEL LEGAL SYSTEM
The question then is: how can we make this fragmen-
tation more palatable? This section argues in favour of
promoting the rule of law through some degree of con-
stitutionalization that takes into account the changing
power of the State vis-à-vis the international and
domestic context, and accounts for the observed multi-
level governance systems.
At the global level, although there has been an intensive
growth of rules since 1945, these are often applied arbi-
trarily within the anarchic global system.106 This is often
described as the unfinished rule of law project at the
international level.107 The ‘rule of law’ concept implies
that rules must be applied to all without discrimination,
be made public, should not be applied retroactively,
should be clear and consistent and thus not arbitrary,
should be equitable, and should be stable and provide a
degree of predictability about the direction in which
future rules will develop. The rule of law is an element
of the concept of ‘good governance’,108 which also
includes the right of social actors to participate in gov-
ernance processes, the need for these processes to be
transparent, the need to ensure that decision makers
are held accountable, that policies are efficient, equi-
table, effective and responsive.
Those supporting the rule of law tend to be fromEurope
and the developing countries,109 while those opposing it
tend to come from the United States. For instance,
Madeleine Albright reportedly submitted that former
President George W. Bush talked about promoting the
rule of law in countries, but is ‘allergic to treaties
designed to strengthen the rule of law in such areas as
money-laundering, biological weapons, crimes against
humanity and the environment’.110 Opponents of the
concept argue that its substantive and procedural
content is contested,111 that it is not politically feasible
because of power politics since power implies rule by
law and politics will become equal to the law,112 and that
at the international level we are only talking of rules of
international law.113 Furthermore, they argue that ‘[t]he
99 This includes development issues in general, agencies that deal
with development, such as the UN Development Group, and the 1986
Declaration on the Right to Development (UN General Assembly
Resolution A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986).
100 This includes bilateral and multilateral assistance by individual
States, the development of aid policy within the OECD Development
Assistance Committee, and the twenty year-old discussions on
‘new and additional aid’ to deal with environmental problems.
See J. Gupta, ‘Global Governance: Development Cooperation’, in
J. Gupta and N. van de Grijp (eds.), Mainstreaming Climate Change
in Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for
the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 99.
101 This includes, e.g., the 2010 human right to water and sanitation
adopted by the UN General Assembly, n. 32 above.
102 See Earth System Governance Project, n. 58 above, at 3.
103 See M. Allen, n. 54 above.
104 See Earth System Governance Project, n. 58 above, at 4.
105 Ibid., at 5.
106 K. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers’, 14:2 Yale Journal of International Law
(1989), 335; F. Boyle, ‘The Irrelevance of International Law: The
Schism between International Law and International Politics’, 10:2
California Western International Law Journal (1980), 193.
107 ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-
first Century’, Report of the Secretary General (UN Doc. A/54/2000,
27 March 2000), at paragraph 326.
108 See, inter alia, M. Doornbos, ‘Good Governance: The Rise and
Decline of a Policy Metaphor?’, 37:6 Journal of Development Studies
(2001), 93; A. Seif El-Dawla, ‘Good Governance after September 11th
2001: A New Dimension for International Development Cooperation’,
3:1 Griffin’s View on International and Comparative Law (2002), 15;
N. Woods, ‘Good Governance in International Organizations’, 5:1
Global Governance (1999), 39.
109 E. Kwakwa, ‘The Rule of Law and Global Governance in the
Twenty-first Century’, in Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference of
the African Society of International And Comparative Law (Kampala,
1994); A. Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’, 36 German Year-
book of International Law (1993), 15.
110 G. Whittell, ‘Albright Attacks US Foreign Policy as Schizophrenic’,
The Times (21 May 2002), at 8.
111 P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law:
An Analytical Framework’, in R. Bellamy (ed.), The Rule of Law and
the Separation of Powers (Dartmouth, 2005), 95; B. Hager, The Rule
of Law: A Lexicon for Policy Makers (Mamsfield Center for Pacific
Affairs, 2000), 4; S.L. Esquith, ‘Toward a Democratic Rule of Law:
East and West’, 27:3 Political Theory (1999), 334.
112 R. Baum, ‘Modernization and Legal Reform in Post-Mao China:
The Re-birth of Socialist Legality’, 14:2 Studies in Comparative
Communism (1986), 69.
113 See A. Watts, n. 109 above.
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fight for an international Rule of Law is a fight against
politics’,114 and is thus not possible. The rule of law at
the inter-State level is inherently contradictory because
it is both based on State practice and aims at being
objective and normative;115 and that while the proce-
dural elements promote stability and maintaining the
status quo, the substantive elements question the status
quo.116 Since the international arena is not a community
of States with common values, powerful countries will
determine agendas, principles and instruments.117
However, there are good reasons to support the rule of
law and constitutionalization projects. First, adopting a
systems approach shows us that we share one planet
and we have one set of planetary boundaries. This calls
for a common approach. Second, climate change, and
many of the common global, current and yet long-
term problems, can only be systematically addressed
through a consistent and predictable body of rules.
Third, various voluntary, hybrid governance activities
often do not meet the criteria of legitimacy, equity
and predictability.118 Fourth, the idea of a common, sys-
temic, comprehensive, legitimate, equitable and pre-
dictable system often has to compete with the reality of
ad hoc changes in law which themselves are compro-
mising on accountability, legitimacy, equity and pre-
dictability and are going soft, thereby questioning the
very raison d’être of law. Fifth, political processes in the
developed countries see the rule of law as essential
within their own contexts, and have been actively pro-
moting it in the developing world119 as both an ‘objective
of and condition for development assistance’.120 If it is
so important domestically, then how can it be less
important internationally?121 Finally, it is now fool-
hardy to continue a hypocritical approach as the new
hegemons may have an increasing influence on global-
ization in the future. The values of current and future
hegemons if included in the rule of law project may seek
to benefit all countries. Politics needs law to sustain its
legitimacy,122 and ‘those who seek to bestow legitimacy
must themselves embody it; and those who invoke
international law must themselves submit to it’.123
INSTITUTIONALIZING RULE
OF LAW THROUGH
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
If we accept that the rule of law needs to be pushed
further, then the next question is how do we institution-
alize this? This can be done through the process of
constitutionalization. Such a process can draw inspira-
tion from jus cogens norms – that is, norms ‘accepted
and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole . . . from which no derogation is per-
mitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same
character’;124 and obligations erga omnes – that is, obli-
gations owed towards the international community as a
whole,125 the fulfilment of which is in the interest of the
international community.126 These obligations include
the duties of States concerning the basic rights of
humans127 (i.e., the protection of human life and the
conditions indispensable to safeguarding human
dignity, human worth and the development of the
human personality).128 The respect for human rights is,
in turn, related to environmental protection because
environmental degradation is, in itself, a serious threat
to human life and health.129 Thus States would have an
obligation erga omnes to protect the environment and
promote sustainable development. The International
Court of Justice does not distinguish clearly between
jus cogens and obligations erga omnes.130 However,
this does not impede the acknowledgement and obser-
vation of these norms. The protection of human rights –
a common principle of humankind, or a global value
(another contested term131) – can be achieved through
the protection of the environment and the promotion of
114 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 11:1 European
Journal of International Law (1990), 4, at 5.
115 Ibid., at 5.
116 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford
University Press, 1995).
117 G. Simpson, ‘The Situation on the International Legal Theory
Front: The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power’, 11:2 European
Journal of International Law (2000), 439.
118 See Earth System Governance Project, n. 58 above, at 6–7.
119 T. Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, Foreign Affairs (March/
April 1998). The World Bank has begun 600 governance related
programmes at national level. See C. Santiso, ‘Good Governance
and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality’, 7:1 Geor-
getown Public Policy Review (2001), 1.
120 See C. Santiso, n. 118 above, at 1.
121 W. Sandelius, ‘National Sovereignty versus the Rule of Law’, 25:1
American Political Science Review (1933), 1; P. Fitzpatrick, ‘ “Gods
Would Be Needed . . .”: American Empire and the Rule of (Interna-
tional) Law’, 16:3 Leiden Journal of International Law (2003), 429.
122 P. Fitzpatrick, n. 120 above.
123 Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly (New York,
21 September 2004), found at <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid=1088>.
124 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969),
Article 53. These rules include the prohibitions of genocide, the right
of peoples to self-determination and the respect for basic human
rights. B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of
the International Community’, 36:3 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law (1998), at 529–590.
125 B. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in Interna-
tional Law’, 250 Recueil des Cours (1994), 217, at 298.
126 See B. Simma, n.125 above, at 300.
127 See B. Fassbender, n. 124 above, at 591.
128 R.S. Pathak, ‘The Human Rights System as a Conceptual Frame-
work for Environmental Law’, in E. Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental
Change and International Law (UNU Press, 1992), 209.
129 S. Giorgetta, ‘The Right to a Healthy Environment’, in N. Schrijver,
and F. Weiss (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development:
Principles and Practice (Brill, 2004), 381.
130 See B. Simma, n.125 above, at 299.
131 O. Spijkers, ‘What’s Running the World: Global Values, Interna-
tional Law and the United Nations’, 4:1 Interdisciplinary Journal of
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sustainable development. The latter, as a means to
achieve the former, can also be considered a global
value.
In substantive terms, the constitutionalization project
could draw inspiration from the UN Charter,132 whose
constitutional character of providing fundamental prin-
ciples and global values for society is presently
debated.133 However, some values are globally shared –
namely, respect for human dignity, social progress and
sustainable development, peace and security, and jus-
tice.134 Other sources of inspiration include the Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development,135 the
human rights arena,136 the discussions on the right to
development,137 and the emerging norms on the equi-
table sharing of transboundary resources in the water
arena.138
The rule of law and the constitutionalization projects
also need to take cognizance of the changing realities in
State structure and domestic law. The State is a sover-
eign legal entity in international relations but its role is
under pressure because of globalization and the shift
from government to governance, which are accompa-
nied by the rise of the non-State actor. This is not an
either/or situation, but a paradox with which we will
have to live. Furthermore, given that the State is still the
legal negotiating unit in public international law, it is
the key authority within the domestic system empow-
ered by national constitutions and legal systems. To the
extent that the power of the State is contested and it
shrinks, it may be unable to promote the rule of law
(especially in the context of some developing coun-
tries). It may not have the authority to regulate the
domestic context, thereby allowing other transnational
actors to take over the process of governance.
Furthermore, although the State is the legal authority,
its power is eroding and other actors and levels of gov-
ernance are assuming greater responsibilities. Hence,
the constitutionalization project needs to broaden its
intergovernmental character to include different actors
at multiple levels of governance. This is also justified by
the fact that whether environmental issues are defined
as global (global heritage, global concern, global public
goods, systems perspective) or local is often determined
by the politics of scale,139 and it is becoming clear that
most environmental problems are simultaneously both
local and global, and have both local through to global
drivers/causes and impacts. Law, too, may need to
examine the potential of developing a conceptual
framework for analyzing the newmultilevel governance
frameworks. Some efforts in this direction are already
visible with national courts being empowered by inter-
national treaties to deal with transboundary issues.140
BACKCASTING TO THE FUTURE
A transition to a rule of law world can be achieved
through four different steps141: ideas; the agency of
actors; institutions; and policy windows/tipping points
that allow for change. The idea is the need for constitu-
tionalization within which multilevel governance
systems can function. This idea needs to be promoted
by the appropriate actors, including legal scholars,
global leaders (e.g., Kofi Annan), countries (e.g., the
countries of the European Union) and social move-
ments. For example, Global Transition 2012 – a civil
society network is aiming to create social support for a
global green and fair economy that meets minimum
needs, stays within planetary boundaries and is adap-
tive – could become a carrier of the notion of the rule of
law.142 The third step is the need for institutions that
support this idea – for example, national courts, human
rights courts, international arbitrators and other adju-
dicators. And then there is a need for the right moment
to push these ideas. We argue that what moment could
be better than the present? We are facing global
environmental, financial, economic and demographic
crises, and existing powers are threatened by the rise of
new ones who may use the absence of the rule of law at
global level to bring alternative and less acceptable
rules. New powers have always asked for a new eco-
nomic and political order and have questioned the ineq-
uity of the global system. In addition, civil society has
been activated world-wide, twitter is available as a tool
for mass communication of ideas in a simple way, and
the stage is being set for Rio+20!
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that current international envi-
ronmental governance is reactive, incoherent, frag-
132 Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945).
133 See, e.g., B. Fassbender, n. 124 above, at 529; B. Simma, n.125,
at 256–85; T.M. Franck, ‘Is the UN Charter a Constitution?’, in S.
Chesterman et al. (eds.), Law and Practice of the United Nations:
Documents and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2008), 4.
134 See O. Spijkers, n. 131 above, at 71.
135 The Rio Declaration includes 27 principles that can help divide
responsibilities between nations in environmental and developmental
problems. See Rio Declaration, n. 24 above.
136 Here, social and economic rights including the right to access
water and sanitation services could form an element of such a con-
stitutionalization process.
137 Declaration on the Right to Development, n. 99 above.
138 See Watercourses Convention, n. 31 above, Article 6.
139 J. Gupta, ‘Global Change: Analysing Scale and Scaling in Envi-
ronmental Governance’, in O.R. Young et al. (eds.), Institutions
and Environmental Change: Principal Findings, Applications and
Research Frontiers (MIT Press, 2008), at 225.
140 For example, the Southern African Development Communities’
water law makes arrangements for this.
141 L. Lebel, ‘Transitions in Water Governance in Developing Asia’,
Presentation at ‘Water Governance Meeting the Challenges of Global
Change’, European Science Foundation, Obergurgl, 7 June 2011.
142 See <http://globaltransition2012.org/2011/12/welcome-to-global-
transition-2012>.
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mented, inequitable, unable to account for systems
approaches, and ad hoc rather than principled. The lack
of political will, path-dependency, technological and
institutional lock-in and strong vested interests are
blocking the adoption of policy options that may be
commensurate with the rate of current problems.When
we project into the future, old problems are exacerbated
and new problems will likely emerge in 2050. If inter-
national law and policy are unable to deal with current
problems, will the incremental process of law develop-
ment be able to deal with the anticipated problems of
the future?
This article concludes that because of the interconnect-
edness of problems, governance is likely to remain frag-
mented. However, if we are to make sense of the
fragmented policy process, if there is to be the rule of
law over the rule of power, then some degree of consti-
tutionalization, providing a framework for multilevel
governance systems and the green economy, becomes
inevitable and necessary in order to protect basic
human rights, the rights of developing countries to
develop, the equitable sharing of resources between
States, and the sharing of responsibilities for problems
caused to others in accordance with key principles.
Although the Rio+20 Summit is occurring within a
growing movement to promote the ‘green economy’,
such an economy will only be sustainable within the
context of a ‘green and equitable rule of law polity’.
Joyeeta Gupta is professor at the Institute for Environ-
mental Studies, VU University Amsterdam and at the
UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, Delft, and
adjunct professor at the School of Commerce, Division of
Business, University of South Australia. The author has
worked on this project as part of the EU FP7 Project on
REDD Alert ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Degradation through Alternative Landuses in Rain-
forests of the Tropics’ (contract number 226310).
Nadia Sanchez is a freelance researcher, with a Master of
Laws (LL.M. in Advanced Studies in Public International
Law) from Leiden University. She is currently working
on her PhD research proposal.
JOYEETA GUPTA AND NADIA SANCHEZ RECIEL 21 (1) 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
22
